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Far Beyond Baker: Heuristics and the Inadequacy of the Reasonable
Apprehension of Bias Analysis
Abstract
When we consider bias in an adjudicative setting, we think about cases such as Baker v. Canada where
the interviewing officer’s emphasis on the applicant’s number of children, economic status, and mental
health is glaring. It is easy to become accustomed to thinking about bias in clear examples such as
prejudice against people of a disadvantaged group. However, bias can also be subtly present in the
subconscious mind, even when a person appears to be acting objectively. The development of cognitive
psychology research has revealed that the mind relies on heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to make quick
decisions. Heuristics research divides the mind into two systems of operation: The first operates
automatically, while the second operates methodically. Heuristics are a function of the former and are
consequently difficult to clearly observe and readily identify. Subconscious reliance on heuristics when
approaching tasks that demand objectivity can result in decisions that are unintentionally guided by bias,
rather than evidence.
A reasonable apprehension of bias (RAB) claim is advanced when a party suspects bias on the part of an
adjudicator. The question is whether an informed reasonable person would reasonably perceive bias on
the part of the adjudicator. The onus is not to prove bias, but merely an appearance of bias. The test is an
appeal to the maxim that justice must not only be done but should be seen to be done. The analysis is
designed to protect not only the parties but also the public perception of the legal system. In this sense,
the RAB test is overinclusive. Conversely, consideration of the RAB test, in light of cognitive biases and
heuristic reasoning, reveals that the test is also underinclusive. The driving force behind the RAB analysis
appears to be that justice must be seen to be done. Neither the informed reasonable person’s knowledge
of the law nor the community can help discover veiled or subtle cognitive biases. We are left with a
conundrum: The original premise that justice must be done may be violated covertly without triggering
the prevailing test for a RAB, leaving an unintentional blind spot.
In order to address the shortcomings of the RAB analysis, I propose the implementation of preventative
measures to decrease adjudicators’ vulnerability to cognitive biases. These measures can be established
by increasing adjudicators’ understanding of heuristics and counteracting potential intuitive
predispositions. Development of remedial measures should consider scarce judicial and adjudicative
resources.
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When we consider bias in an adjudicative setting, we think about cases such as Baker v. Canada
where the interviewing officer’s emphasis on the applicant’s number of children, economic
status, and mental health is glaring. It is easy to become accustomed to thinking about bias
in clear examples such as prejudice against people of a disadvantaged group. However, bias
can also be subtly present in the subconscious mind, even when a person appears to be
acting objectively. The development of cognitive psychology research has revealed that the
mind relies on heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to make quick decisions. Heuristics research
divides the mind into two systems of operation: The first operates automatically, while the
second operates methodically. Heuristics are a function of the former and are consequently
difficult to clearly observe and readily identify. Subconscious reliance on heuristics when
approaching tasks that demand objectivity can result in decisions that are unintentionally
guided by bias, rather than evidence.
A reasonable apprehension of bias (RAB) claim is advanced when a party suspects bias on
the part of an adjudicator. The question is whether an informed reasonable person would
reasonably perceive bias on the part of the adjudicator. The onus is not to prove bias, but
merely an appearance of bias. The test is an appeal to the maxim that justice must not only
be done but should be seen to be done. The analysis is designed to protect not only the
parties but also the public perception of the legal system. In this sense, the RAB test is
overinclusive. Conversely, consideration of the RAB test, in light of cognitive biases and
heuristic reasoning, reveals that the test is also underinclusive. The driving force behind
the RAB analysis appears to be that justice must be seen to be done. Neither the informed
reasonable person’s knowledge of the law nor the community can help discover veiled or
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subtle cognitive biases. We are left with a conundrum: The original premise that justice must
be done may be violated covertly without triggering the prevailing test for a RAB, leaving an
unintentional blind spot.
In order to address the shortcomings of the RAB analysis, I propose the implementation
of preventative measures to decrease adjudicators’ vulnerability to cognitive biases. These
measures can be established by increasing adjudicators’ understanding of heuristics and
counteracting potential intuitive predispositions. Development of remedial measures should
consider scarce judicial and adjudicative resources.
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WHEN WE THINK ABOUT BIAS in an adjudicative setting, we may think about

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).1 Bias can be inferred
from the interviewing officer’s undue emphasis on Ms. Baker’s eight children,
economic status, and mental health.2 It is easy to become accustomed to thinking
about bias when it manifests obviously and aggressively. However, bias can also be
subtly present in the subconscious mind even when it is not objectively apparent
in the person’s actions. Moreover, seasoned adjudicators are not impermeable to
these veiled or subtle cognitive biases, which may be derived from heuristics—
simple procedures for the mind to solve difficult problems, albeit with often
imperfect answers.3 Heuristics belong to the automatic processing compartment of
the mind, which has significant influence on our daily decision making.4 It works
in stark contrast to our active or concentrated mind, which is characterized by
methodical analysis and a sense of agency.5
While cognitive biases and the mind’s automatic function make our
lives easier, they can also materially bias our decisions. Subconscious reliance
on heuristics when approaching tasks that demand objectivity can result in
decisions that are unintentionally guided by bias rather than evidence. This
is a fundamental concern in adjudicative settings, where the “existence of an
open mind or a weighing of the particular circumstances of the case free from
stereotypes” is vital.6
In this article, I consider whether the reasonable apprehension of bias (RAB)
test can effectively detect cognitive bias on the part of a judge or an adjudicator
in a quasi-judicial setting. By considering the constitutive elements of the
RAB test, I posit that the current legal framework captures only obvious and
observable instances of bias, not subtle cases of cognitive bias. The scope of the
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

[1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker].
Ibid at para 5.
For an informal and accessible summary of heuristics, see Daniel Kahneman, Thinking,
Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013) at 98; Justin Fox, “Instinct Can Beat
Analytical Thinking,” Harvard Business Review (20 June 2014), online: <hbr.org/2014/06/
instinct-can-beat-analytical-thinking>.
Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, “Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgement” in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds,
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement (Cambridge University
Press, 2002) 49.
See Steven A Sloman, “Two Systems of Reasoning” in Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman,
supra note 4, 379 at 383. Sloman notes that the rule-based system is responsible for “[d]
eliberation,” “[e]xplanation,” and “[f ]ormal analysis” (ibid). Anecdotally and relying on our
own experience, we know that these functions are fundamental parts of any learned task.
Baker, supra note 1 at para 48.
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RAB analysis is, therefore, overinclusive, in that it captures the apprehension of
bias where there may be no actual bias, and underinclusive, in that it does not
capture all instances of cognitive bias. In order to address the shortcomings of
the RAB analysis, I propose preventative measures that address an adjudicator’s
vulnerability to cognitive biases.
This article proceeds in five Parts. Part I examines the structure of the RAB
analysis with a focus on the knowledge of the informed reasonable person. Part II
presents an overview of heuristic reasoning, the two schools of heuristic research,
and a selection of cognitive biases that can affect adjudicative reasoning. Part III
considers the extent to which the RAB test can capture instances of cognitive
bias. Part IV argues that the scope of the RAB test inadvertently overlooks
symptomless cognitive biases by focusing exclusively on the overt; it concludes
by providing a series of recommendations to reduce adjudicators’ susceptibility
to inappropriate intuitive reasoning.
This article relies on established scholarship on cognitive biases to analyze
the adequacy of the common law’s response to potential bias on the part of the
adjudicator. The field of psychology and the law is vast. To that end, I do not
present an exhaustive summary of the literature on cognitive biases, nor on its
intersection with the RAB analysis. Instead, I focus on heuristics and present
a high-level discussion of the relevant schools of thought and basic tenets that
allow for an evaluation of the RAB analysis from a legal perspective.

I. THE RAB ANALYSIS AND THE INFORMED
REASONABLE PERSON
A. THE GENERAL TEST FOR RAB

The RAB analysis is the mechanism available in the dispute process to address
the appearance of bias on the part of the adjudicator. In order to assess the
applicability of the RAB test to situations where the presence of cognitive bias is
alleged, it is necessary to understand the structure and elements of the analysis.
The current test has remained relatively unchanged since Justice de Grandpré’s
1978 dissenting judgment in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al v. National
Energy Board et al. (“Committee for Justice”), which contemplates that an informed
reasonable person must reasonably perceive bias on the part of the decision maker.7
This articulation of the test has garnered general acceptance and approval.8
7.
8.

[1978] 1 SCR 369 at 394-95 [Committee for Justice].
See Canadian Pacific Ltd v Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 SCR 3 at para 81; Baker, supra
note 1 at para 46.
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The RAB analysis is highly fact specific and contextual.9 This is perhaps the
greatest barrier that must be overcome when relying on indications of cognitive
bias as evidence. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has noted that “[t]here
are no shortcuts” and has warned against “peremptory rules” and “‘textbook’
instances.”10 The facts that give rise to the RAB analysis “must be addressed carefully
in light of the entire context.”11 Consequently, it is not enough to extrapolate
merely from an adjudicator’s past decisions, actions, or behaviour.12 The analysis
must be specific to the context and events that give rise to the allegations.
A party claiming the existence of a RAB must meet a high threshold to
successfully rebut the presumption of impartiality,13 and the burden of
proof is on them.14 The standard or threshold to rebut the presumption of
impartiality and to establish a RAB is one of serious and substantial grounds,
which Justice de Grandpré noted must not “be related to the ‘very sensitive or
scrupulous conscience.’”15
The availability and efficacy of cognitive bias research as evidence of RAB
are constrained by the type of decision making and the degree of independence
required of the decision maker. Administrative boards are held to varying
standards depending on their function. Consideration of cognitive bias and
the RAB test is, therefore, limited to those cases dealing with truly adjudicative
functions.16 Boards that are primarily adjudicative and quasi-judicial attract a
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.
15.
16.

See Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45 at para 77 [Wewaykum].
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Turoczi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1423 [Turoczi].
In Turoczi, the Federal Court dismissed an appeal that relied on the statistical acceptance
and rejection rate of the board member. The court noted that “the statistics provided by
the applicants are not, without more, sufficiently informative. Furthermore, one must
question what the ‘informed person’ would take from them” (ibid at para 13). However,
the court did leave room for the use of statistical evidence in future, more compelling, cases
(ibid at para 18).
The level of impartiality prescribed will vary depending on the decision maker (e.g., a judge
at trial compared to an elected official serving on a panel for a commission). See e.g.
Newfoundland Telephone Co v Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities),
[1992] 1 SCR 623 at 638-39 [Newfoundland Telephone]. The degree of impartiality will not
be a material point of analysis in this article.
See R v S (RD), [1997] 3 SCR 484 at 532 [S (RD)]. On the presumption of impartiality,
see Zündel v Citron, [2000] 4 FC 225 at para 37 (FCA), leave to appeal to SCC refused,
[2000] SCCA No 322.
Committee for Justice, supra note 7 at 395; Wewaykum, supra note 9 at para 76.
Justice Cory in Newfoundland Telephone noted that the “great diversity of administrative
boards” affects the necessary level of neutrality and restraint in the conduct of the decision
maker. Supra note 13 at 638.
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standard comparable to that of the courts.17 On the other hand, boards composed
of elected officials, such as those in Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland
(Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities) (“Newfoundland Telephone”) and Old
St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City of ) (“Old St Boniface”), or those
that deal primarily with policy matters, are held to a more lenient standard.18
Ultimately, the level of leniency is determined based on the function, and not just
the identity, of the panel. Elected officials acting in an adjudicative, as opposed
to a legislative, capacity have traditionally been held to a stricter standard.19 This
article concerns itself with the standard applicable to judges and members of
quasi-judicial boards, not with the standard applicable to an administrative board
serving a legislative function.
The “open mind” test is the more lenient standard applicable to the spectrum
of administrative boards serving a legislative function. As held by Justice Sopinka
in Old St Boniface, this threshold is met when the court concludes that the
appearance of bias has reached the level of a “final opinion” that “cannot be
dislodged.”20 In Newfoundland Telephone, the SCC required a claimant to establish
prejudgment at a level where “representations to the contrary would be futile.”21
Adjudicators are able to hold and vocalize strong opinions in favour of one
outcome, so long as they have not definitively prejudged the case. Accordingly,
adjudicators are merely required to hear the case without a closed mind, which
makes it difficult to argue that they were subconsciously biased.
B. WHO IS THE INFORMED REASONABLE PERSON OR OBSERVER?

The applicability of the RAB test in the context of cognitive biases rests on
the interpretation of the informed reasonable person and their knowledge.
The characteristics of the informed reasonable person go beyond those of the
reasonable person simpliciter. The Court of Appeal for Ontario has described the
latter, in the context of negligence, as “a mythical creature of the law”:22
He is not an extraordinary or unusual creature; he is not superhuman; he is not
required to display the highest skill of which anyone is capable; he is not a genius
who can perform uncommon feats, nor is he possessed of unusual powers of
foresight. He is a person of normal intelligence who makes prudence a guide to his
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid. See also Old St Boniface Residents Assn Inc v Winnipeg (City of ), [1990] 3 SCR 1170
[Old St Boniface].
19. See Beaverford v Thorhild (County No 7), 2013 ABCA 6 at paras 26-30.
20. Supra note 18 at 1197.
21. Supra note 13 at 638.
22. Arland v Taylor, 1955 CarswellOnt 44 (WL Can) at para 29 (CA).

Nayerahmadi, Far Beyond Baker 345

conduct. He does nothing that a prudent man would not do and does not omit to
do anything a prudent man would do.23

In contrast, the informed reasonable person, while not rising to superhero levels,
can be attributed knowledge of the applicable law and judicial process as well
as the contextual background of the case.24 This specialized knowledge can be
necessary to assess the presence of bias.
For the purposes of the RAB analysis, the reasonable person is “informed,
practical, and realistic” and will “[consider] the matter in some detail.”25 In R v.
S (RD) (“S (RD)”), the SCC clarified the qualities of the informed reasonable
person.26 Justices L’Heureux-Dubé and Mclachlin (as she then was) recognized
that the informed reasonable person “is not a ‘very sensitive or scrupulous’
person, but rather a right-minded person familiar with the circumstances of
the case.”27 Justices L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin went on to emphasize
the need for a contextual approach and a recognition of “the impossibility of
judicial neutrality.”28
The UK House of Lords took a slightly different view in its formulation of the
RAB test in R. v. Gough (“Gough”).29 Lord Goff of Chieveley concluded that the
court “personifies” the reasonable person in cases of apparent bias.30 As discussed
in Part I(C), below, the practical application of the test articulated by Lord Goff is
not dissimilar to the standard developed in Canadian jurisprudence. Nevertheless,
when the House of Lords revisited the RAB test in 2001, it reintroduced the
“informed observer” (the English equivalent of the informed reasonable person)
to the analysis.31 The modified articulation of the test under English law is now
more aligned with the test applied in Canada: “The question is whether the
fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude
that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.”32

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ibid.
See S (RD), supra note 14 at 505.
Ibid. See also Committee for Justice, supra note 7 at 386.
Supra note 14 at 505-09.
Ibid at 505.
Ibid at 509.
[1993] AC 646 (HL (Eng)) [Gough].
Ibid at 670.
Magill v Porter, [2001] UKHL 67 at para 103.
Ibid.
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C. KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFORMED REASONABLE PERSON

The knowledge of the informed reasonable person has been determined, both in
Canada and in England, to include knowledge of judicial process, the law, and
the context specific to the case. The SCC has considered two factors: “knowledge
and understanding of the judicial process,” including “the nature of judging,”
and knowledge of the claimant’s community.33 The House of Lords has also
recognized that the court must “ascertain the relevant circumstances from the
available evidence.”34
1.

THE INFORMED REASONABLE PERSON’S KNOWLEDGE OF JUDICIAL
PROCESS

The reasonable person “expects [adjudicators] to undertake an open-minded,
carefully considered, and dispassionately deliberate investigation of the
complicated reality of each case before them.”35 Justices L’Heureux-Dubé and
McLachlin recognized that judges may be influenced by, and rely on, their
individual perspectives and backgrounds in adjudication.36 However, in applying
the law to the facts, it is the law, and not an adjudicator’s individual beliefs,
that governs.37 Therefore, the informed reasonable person is cognizant of the
adjudicators’ inability to be fully neutral. They recognize that, while the
adjudicator’s perspective may be an asset, the proper application of the law to the
facts requires a rigorous, dispassionate, and open-minded process.
With respect to the specific details of court process and knowledge of relevant
laws, courts have occasionally attributed strong, or even full, knowledge to the
informed reasonable person. In R. v. Lippé, Chief Justice Dickson attributed
the “full knowledge of the Quebec Municipal Court System, including all of
its safeguards” to the informed reasonable person.38 Similarly, in England, the
fair-minded and informed observer has been given detailed knowledge of the law
and legal customs, including courtroom practices and procedures.39 For instance,
in Sengupta v. Holmes, Lord Justice Laws of the England and Wales Court of
Appeal found that the fair-minded observer should have knowledge that a judge
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

S (RD), supra note 14 at 505.
Gough, supra note 29 at 670.
S (RD), supra note 14 at 506.
Ibid at 505.
Ibid at 506.
[1991] 2 SCR 114 at 152.
See Simon Atrill, “Who Is the ‘Fair-Minded and Informed Observer’?: Bias after Magill”
(2003) 62 Cambridge LJ 279 at 280.
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may, at the start of the hearing, have a strong preference for a particular result,
but change their minds:
That judges in fact change their minds under the influence of oral argument is not
an arcane feature of the system; it is at the centre of it. Knowledge of it should, in
my judgment, be attributed to the fair-minded and informed observer; otherwise
the test for apparent bias is too far distant from reality. It is a commonplace for a
hearing to start with a clear expression of view by the judge or judges, which may
strongly favour one side; it would not cross the mind of counsel on the other side
then to suggest that the judge should recuse himself; rather, he knows where he is,
and the position he has to meet.40

In practice, the attribution of legal knowledge to the informed reasonable person
is similar to the approach adopted by Lord Goff in Gough.41 The test can demand
such specialized knowledge of the law and legal procedure that it effectively
requires the court to substitute its own knowledge, or that of a capable lawyer,
for the knowledge of an informed reasonable person.
The informed reasonable person should also appreciate that finders of fact
must be aware of the context of the case.42 In S(RD), Justices L’Heureux-Dubé
and McLachlin recognized that a conscious and contextual inquiry into
fact-finding is a step towards impartiality, specifically emphasizing the “factual,
social and psychological context” that gives rise to litigation.43 In applying this
contextual inquiry, a court may place itself in the position of the complainant in
order to experience the incident giving rise to litigation from their perspective.44
To comprehend the contextual background, it is appropriate, and may be
necessary, to rely on testimony from expert witnesses, academic studies, and
adjudicators’ personal experience of the society in which they live and work.45
2.

THE INFORMED REASONABLE PERSON’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE
NATURE OF THE COMMUNITY

The informed reasonable person embodies Canadian values, has knowledge of
Canadian history, and is a member of the local community in which the case
arises. The reasonable person not only “supports the fundamental principles
entrenched in the Constitution by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

[2002] EWCA Civ 1104 at para 38 [Sengupta].
Supra note 29.
S (RD), supra note 14 at 506.
Ibid.
Ibid at 507, citing R v Bartle, [1994] 3 SCR 173.
See S (RD), supra note 14 at 507.
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but also has knowledge of discrimination within the local community.46 The
nature of the community thus encompasses Canadian values, supplemented by
specific elements of local communities that may be crucial to understanding the
complainant’s perspective and the adjudicator’s decisions throughout a hearing.

II. UNDERSTANDING HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE BIAS
In November of 1951, the Princeton University football team played Dartmouth
College in the last home game of the season.47 It was a heated affair that left
Princeton’s star player, Dick Kazmaier, injured. The game’s significance to
psychology was not the score, but rather the supporters’ perception of the events.
A survey of local newspapers and campus publications revealed the dichotomy
in the supporters’ reactions. Princetonians judged the game as “rough and dirty”
and believed that the Dartmouth team’s attitude was antagonistic.48 In fact,
when students were presented with a video of the game, the Princeton fans
saw Dartmouth make twice as many infractions as observed by the Dartmouth
fans¾one Princeton alumnus, who was unable to find the alleged infractions,
believed he had received incomplete footage and even asked to receive the
“missing part[s]” of the game.49
Albert H. Hastorf and Hadley Cantril noticed that “the ‘game’ actually was
many different games and that each version of the events that transpired was just
as ‘real’” to the observer.50 The authors determined that people “behave according
to what [they] bring to the occasion.”51 A similar and more elaborative study was
conducted in the legal setting, where participants were shown an altered video
of an actual protest.52 Kahan et al. found support for their initial hypothesis
that “culturally motivated cognition would influence individuals’ perceptions of
facts essential to distinguishing ‘speech’ from ‘conduct’ for the purpose of the
First Amendment.”53 By way of introduction to the topic of cognitive bias, these
46. Ibid at 507-508.
47. See Albert H Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, “They Saw a Game: A Case Study” (1954) 49 J
Abnormal & Soc Psychology 129.
48. Ibid at 130.
49. Ibid at 130, 132.
50. Ibid at 132.
51. Ibid at 133.
52. See Dan M Kahan et al, “‘They Saw a Protest’: Cognitive Illiberalism and the
Speech-Conduct Distinction” (2012) 64 Stan L Rev 851 at 870-74.
53. Ibid at 883. The authors define “culturally motivated cognition” as “a species of motivated
reasoning that promotes congruence between a person’s defining group commitments, on the
one hand, and his or her perceptions of risk and related facts, on the other” (ibid at 859).
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studies show people’s susceptibility to not only interpret, but to actually see, the
same events differently. Cognitive biases also have an effect on our judgement
and decision making, which are the focus of this Part of the article.
The following subsections present a background on cognitive biases
and heuristics. It is not the purpose of this Part, nor of the article as a whole,
to persuade you, one way or another, about the susceptibility of adjudicators to
this form of thinking. The following subsections provide an overview of some of
the established literature and findings in order to properly assess the constitutive
elements of the RAB analysis in light of cognitive biases. An understanding of
these biases also helps to address the blind spot left by the common law and
judicial processes.
A. UNDERSTANDING HEURISTICS

In an ideal world, everyone, including adjudicators, would approach all cases
methodically and objectively,54 similar to traditional economic or statistics-based
decision-making frameworks that focus on optimization and leave little room for
shortcuts. These frameworks assume that the rational person acts to maximize their
utility. In order to do so, they are advised to follow an objective, multi-step, and
linear decision-making framework: (1) identify the problem, (2) gather relevant
information, (3) develop and weigh alternatives, (4) decide on a course of action
and follow through, and (5) reflect on the decision.55 While such a framework
is ideal in a hypothetical world, it would be exhausting to routinely implement.
The problem with rational decision-making frameworks is not that they
yield poor results, but that they are impractical and often unworkable. When
time is constrained, it may be impossible to gather information or develop a
system to weigh alternatives. Similarly, where knowledge is limited, any weighing
of alternatives will be merely speculative. Where both constraints are present,
applying a methodical framework may be impossible, and heuristic reasoning
may be the only solution.56
Heuristics research hypothesizes the mind divided into two systems of
operation, where heuristics would be enabled by the brain’s automatic, as opposed
54. See e.g. Erik Larson, “A Checklist for Making Faster, Better Decisions,” Harvard Business
Review (7 March 2016), online: <hbr.org/2016/03/a-checklist-for-making-faster-betterdecisions>.
55. See “Decision-making process,” online: UMass Dartmouth <www.umassd.edu/fycm/
decisionmaking/process> [UMass].
56. See Gerd Gigerenzer, “Heuristics” in G Gigerenzer & C Engel, eds, Heuristics and the Law
(MIT Press & Dahlem University Press, 2006) 17 at 17.
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to methodical, operations. The systems are “distinguished by their speed,
controllability, and the contents on which they operate”; the former operates
automatically, while the latter operates methodically.57 Within the two-system
metaphor, heuristics are a function of “System 1,” which “quickly proposes
intuitive answers to judgement problems as they arise.”58 On the other hand,
“System 2” is rule based and operates slowly.59 It is the ideal mindset to learn
new skills or solve difficult problems, where time and information are available
to develop an understanding of a field.60 As we learn and develop proficiency,
cognitive operations that were once operated by System 2 migrate to System 1.61
The two systems of our minds function cooperatively, despite at times
being in active competition.62 System 1 continuously analyzes information
and proposes intuitive responses to problems.63 System 2 acts as a gatekeeper,
monitoring the responses of System 1 and, where necessary, correcting or
overriding them.64 When the two systems work in harmony, the suggestions of
System 1 are implemented with little modification by System 2, and there is no
need to undertake a methodical analysis of the problem.65 However, the speed
and efficiency of System 1’s responses may precede and neutralize the responses
of System 2;66 in these cases, our actions are purely reactionary.
B. THE TWO SCHOOLS OF HEURISTIC RESEARCH

Heuristics research has converged to the two-system model of cognition.67
Nevertheless, leading researchers have approached the topic from two opposing
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Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 4 at 51.
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Ibid at 58. See also Sloman, supra note 5 at 383.
See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 4 at 51, 58.
Ibid at 51.
See Sloman, supra note 5 at 391.
See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 4 at 51.
See ibid; Sloman, supra note 5 at 391.
See Sloman, supra note 5 at 391.
See ibid.
This has been the system settled and adopted by a number of psychologists, with varying
schools of thought and backgrounds. See generally Sloman, supra note 5; Kahneman &
Frederick, supra note 4; Gigerenzer, supra note 56; Keith E Stanovich & Richard F West,
“Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?” in Gilovich,
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fronts¾heuristics as the solution and heuristics as the problem.68 The former
school, referred to as Fast and Frugal (F&F), is led by Gerd Gigerenzer and the
Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) group, whose research focuses on the
use of heuristics as an approach to solving problems that are incomplete due to
environmental or informational constraints.69 Under the F&F school, heuristics
are considered indispensable because the alternative optimization regime is
confined to only a small subset of problems¾those where information and
resources are adequately available.70 On the other hand, there is the Heuristics
and Bias (H&B) school that includes the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky, who explore the potential risk of systematic errors resulting from
inappropriate reliance on heuristics.71 According to Gigerenzer, the H&B school
defines heuristics and biases interchangeably because both are the genesis of the
problem.72 Despite the differences between the F&F and H&B schools, both
approaches are relevant to the law and, specifically, to adjudication.
1.

F&F HEURISTICS AND THEIR NECESSITY TO THE APPLICATION OF LAW

System 2 is ordinarily the ideal mindset for learning complex tasks and
solving difficult problems. However, much like the economic decision-making
framework, it too can be impractical. Even though System 2 excels in complex
decision making in a controlled environment, it struggles to function efficiently
when confronted by uncertainty in many real-world dilemmas.73 The F&F
school studies heuristics as decision-making models; these F&F heuristics are
appropriate, and may be the only solution, in an environment constrained by
time and knowledge.74
F&F heuristics help us solve problems efficiently and with greater accuracy
than guesswork. In fact, researchers have found that F&F heuristics can be

68. See Douglas A Kysar et al, “Group Report: Are Heuristics a Problem or a Solution?” in
Gigerenzer & Engel, supra note 56, 103 at 106; Gigerenzer, supra note 56 at 17-18. See
also Mark Kelman, The Heuristics Debate (Oxford University Press, 2011). Kelman presents
a thorough explanation of the interaction between the two schools and their opposing
approaches to heuristics.
69. See Kelman, supra note 68; Kysar et al, supra note 68 at 103-05.
70. See Gigerenzer, supra note 56 at 17.
71. “Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” (1974) 185 Science 1124 at 1124
[Tversky & Kahneman, “Judgement Under Uncertainty”].
72. Supra note 56 at 18.
73. Ibid at 17.
74. See Gerd Gigerenzer, Jean Czerlinski & Laura Martignon, “How Good Are Fast and Frugal
Heuristics?” in Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, supra note 4, 559 at 580.
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equally accurate to linear models of reasoning.75 For example, people can make
predictions based on the “take the best” heuristic, which operates by using the
most valid cue or indicator of the potential answer to discriminate between
alternative solutions.76 Gigerenzer, Czerlinski, and Martignon illustrate the
application of this heuristic by predicting the cities in the United States with the
greatest homeless population based on an available set of factors for each state.77
In comparing two cities, they begin by looking for the presence of rent control,
which is the most accurate signal of a greater homeless population.78 If neither
city employs it (or if both cities employ it and cancel each other out), they move
on to the next best factor¾in this case, vacancy rates¾and, if necessary, other
factors thereafter.79 This process stops when one factor discriminates between
the options.80 The use of heuristics in this manner, as a means to improve the
accuracy of predictions based on incomplete information, can be a reliable form
of decision making.
In the legal context, Gigerenzer argues that the H&B school’s influence on
behavioural law has resulted in misplaced wariness of heuristics.81 I agree with
this notion, and my concerns in this article are not with heuristics in general, but
rather with those specific forms of heuristic reasoning that result in judgement
errors at crucial points in adjudication. Gigerenzer rightly illustrates that judges
and jurors rely on and require some F&F heuristics in order to accomplish
their duties; they “make decisions with limited time and knowledge, and under
degrees of uncertainty where optimization is typically out of reach.”82 Therefore,
to explore how the specific heuristics may bias adjudication, it is necessary that
we understand the utility of heuristics in law and how they can help us make
better decisions under uncertainty.83
In the context of litigation, heuristics are already implemented in the
structure of our legal rules. Legal presumptions operate similarly to heuristics¾by
starting out with a preference for one side or another that must be rebutted, the
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presumption simplifies and speeds up the decision-making process.84 Piperides
et al. use the example of the rule against hearsay and, similarly, the exceptions
to the basic hearsay rule to illustrate this form of reasoning.85 Hearsay evidence,
out-of-court statements proffered for the truth of their content and absent
the opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant,86
is presumptively inadmissible87 unless it satisfies an exclusionary rule or is admitted
through the principled approach.88 In administrative law, this presumption works
in the reverse, as hearsay is presumptively admissible before a tribunal.89 The
RAB analysis also has embedded elements of heuristic reasoning; it begins with a
starting presumption of impartiality on the part of the adjudicator that must be
rebutted by the party advancing the claim.90
One goal of research into the application of F&F heuristics to the law is
to “reduce reliance on naturally occurring heuristics by devising appropriate
cognitive aids.”91 While we see benefits of heuristic reasoning at certain stages of
litigation, it cannot replace methodical and impartial analyses required at other
stages.92 The misuse of heuristics, which will be the focus of Part II(B)(2), below,
poses real dangers for the administration of justice and the principles of law. For
example, the use of F&F in the determination of probative value compared to
prejudicial effects of potential evidence at the admissibility stage may result in
mistaken admittance or exclusion of evidence.93 In the ideal case, these errors
would be either immaterial to the outcome of the decision or errors of law that
are easier to reverse on appeal. Where F&F heuristics result in errors of fact
or mixed fact and law, which do not rise to the palpable and overriding error
standard on appeal, judges are left with a potential dilemma. In these instances,
84. See Callia Piperides et al, “Group Report: What is the Role of Heuristics in Litigation?” in
Gigerenzer & Engel, supra note 56, 343 at 374.
85. Ibid at 358.
86. See David M Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 7th ed (Irwin Law, 2015) at 113;
R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57 at para 35.
87. See R v Baldree, 2013 SCC 35 at para 2; Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 86 at 113.
88. The principled approach to hearsay based on necessity and reliability was set out by the SCC
in R v Khan and was affirmed in R v Smith and R v Starr. See R v Khan, [1990] 2 SCR 531;
R v Smith, [1992] 2 SCR 915; R v Starr, 2000 SCC 40.
89. See Statutory Powers Procedure Act, RSO 1990, c S.22, s 15(1). However, tribunals do have
the power to set their own rules, subject to section 25.0.1 (ibid, s 25.0.1).
90. See e.g. S (RD), supra note 14 at 532; EA Manning Ltd v Ontario (Securities Commission)
(1995), 23 OR (3d) 257 (CA).
91. Piperides et al, supra note 84 at 374.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid at 362.
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Piperides et al. are concerned that adjudicators “may stretch the law to find a legal
error” so that they can order a new trial.94
2.

H&B HEURISTICS AND THE DANGERS THEY POSE TO THE APPLICATION
OF LAW

While System 1 can be appropriate for approaching complex problems,
it is susceptible to cognitive biases that affect decision making; it can also bias
the operations of System 2.95 In specific circumstances, these biases manifest in
systemic errors, such as seeking out only confirming evidence or answering an
easier substituted question instead of the question at issue.96 Our judgements
are intuitive where System 1’s initial proposal is affirmed without significant
modification by System 2.97 For example, an investigator may rely on interrogative
techniques to frame questions in order to solicit a desired response. Research has
revealed that interrogators may use “accusatory techniques of interrogation to
elicit a confession that confirms their prejudgment of guilt.”98 In the same vein,
the “pre-interrogation biases of ‘guilt’ on the part of investigators may lead to
the use of heavy-handed interrogation tactics that are more likely to produce
false confessions—a process that results in confirmation bias in the evaluation of
confession evidence.”99
The H&B school’s approach to heuristic research has formed the basis of
the “intuitive-override” model of judicial decision making, which is regularly
cited and is effectively a modern hybrid of the two dominant models of realism
and formalism.100 It is “‘realist’ in the sense that it recognizes the important
role of the judicial hunch and ‘formalist’ in the sense that it recognizes the
importance of deliberation in constraining the inevitable…influence of
intuition.”101 The model “views judges as ordinary people who tend to make
intuitive, System 1 decisions, but who can override their intuitive reactions with
94. Supra note 84 at 369.
95. See Sloman, supra note 5 at 391.
96. See Tversky & Kahneman, “Judgement Under Uncertainty,” supra note 71 at 1124;
Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 4 at 54.
97. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 4 at 51.
98. See Richard A Leo, “Why Interrogation Contamination Occurs” (2013) 11 Ohio State J
Crim L 193 at 202.
99. Fadia M Narchet, Christian A Meissner & Melissa B Russano, “Modeling the Influence of
Investigator Bias on the Elicitation of True and False Confessions” (2011) 35 L & Human
Behavior 452 at 452-53.
100. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J Rachlinski & Andrew J Wistrich, “Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases” (2007) 93 Cornell L Rev 1 at 2-3, 8.
101. Ibid at 3.
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complex, deliberative thought.”102 It is in practice neither “purely deductive,”
as envisioned by the formalist theorists, nor intuitive rationalization, as proposed
by realists.103 Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich’s research shows that “judges
rely heavily on their intuitive faculties not only when they confront generic
problems…but also when they face the kinds of problems they generally see on
the bench.”104 While judges are capable of overriding intuitive responses, their
experience in adjudication does not leave them impermeable to heuristic-based
cognitive biases.105
C. COGNITIVE BIASES THAT CAN AFFECT ADJUDICATION
1.

ANCHORING HEURISTIC

Judges show a susceptibility to anchoring¾the tendency for people to rely
on or migrate towards an initial value available to them, which unnecessarily
pulls subsequent estimates towards it.106 Tversky and Kahneman argue that the
problem with anchoring is that the subsequent adjustments made after the initial
value tend to be insufficient.107 In the adjudicative setting, anchoring has been
shown to factor into judges’ determination of appropriate damages.108 This was
tested in two studies, each comparing a control group presented with only a
factual scenario and a test group presented with information about either a large
pre-settlement offer (ten million dollars) or an unsuccessful motion to dismiss
based on damages not meeting a minimum amount (seventy-five thousand
dollars).109 In both studies, the average amounts awarded by the judges were
skewed in the direction of the anchor.
2.

REPRESENTATIVENESS HEURISTIC

The representativeness heuristic is present where the probability that a subject
belongs to a particular group or category is determined by the degree to which
its traits are representative of, or similar to, our stereotypical understanding of
the group.110 The representativeness heuristic breeds a series of consequences,
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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including neglect of or insensitivity to prior probabilities and sample sizes,
illusions of validity, errors in predictability, and misconceptions of chance and of
regression.111 Representativeness effectively makes the individual violate statistical
rules that should otherwise be applied. For example, in considering illusions of
validity, where the confidence of a person’s response is primarily dependent on
the degree of representativeness (the quality of a match), Tversky and Kahneman
suggest that people are more confident in predicting the future average grade of
an undergraduate student where the student has all Bs in the first year as opposed
to a mix of As and Cs.112 The redundancy of the previous output has the effect
of decreasing the accuracy of predictions while simultaneously increasing the
confidence of the predictor.
Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich’s research supports a finding that judges
are susceptible to this form of heuristic reasoning.113 In their study, the judges
were given a fact pattern based on an old English case about a barrel that fell and
struck the plaintiff as it was being hoisted by rope.114 The question was whether
the incident was the result of negligence on the part of the workers or the failure
of the rope. The government safety inspectors assessed the probability of the
alternatives and presented them in the following manner: The likelihood of the
barrel falling if it was secured negligently was 90 per cent; the likelihood of the
rope failing was 1 per cent; and workers negligently secure barrels 1 in 1,000
times.115 While unintuitive, the answer is that the likelihood of the rope failing
(1 per cent) is greater than negligence (0.09 per cent). Most judges answered the
question incorrectly, likely as a result of the representativeness heuristic. I have
some reservation about extending the findings from this particular study to the
real-world setting. The inspector’s assessment was presented in incomparable
forms, i.e., 1 per cent compared to 90 per cent of 1 in 1000 times, which in
an adversarial system would face the scrutiny of the opposing counsel who
would seldom allow misinterpretation in this manner. In fact, the F&F school
of heuristics is critical of the H&B scholars because the F&F school posits
that the genesis of “the gap between good real-world performance and the bad
lab performance” is a result of the H&B school’s use of misleading or poorly
constructed experiments.116 Despite my reservations relating to this particular
111.
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study, the underlying theory is relevant to understanding the potential influence
of the representativeness heuristic on adjudicative decision making.
3.

HINDSIGHT BIAS

The final scenario tested by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich’s judicial
decision-making questions focused on hindsight bias—the “tendency to
overestimate the predictability of past events.”117 The judges in the study were
presented with a fact pattern to be considered on appeal. Each judge was randomly
given one of three possible decisions of the court of appeal: “‘affirmed,’ ‘vacated,’
or ‘lesser sanction.’”118 They were then asked which of the three possible outcomes
was the most likely to occur based on all of the information presented. The results
show that “[l]earning an outcome clearly influenced the judges’ ex post assessment
of the ex ante likelihood of various possible outcomes.”119 However, the authors
note that judges are able to mitigate and overcome, to a certain degree, the effects
of hindsight bias. In another study involving a “highly intricate, rule-bound”
analysis, the effects of hindsight were significantly lower, possibly because the
nature of the analysis demands System 2 deliberative thinking.120 Moreover, the
authors believe that it is possible for intricate areas of the law to signal to judges
that potential inconsistencies between intuition and the governing law require
careful deliberation.121
4.

AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC

The availability heuristic applies where “people assess the frequency of a class or
the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can
be brought to mind.”122 The reliance on availability results in a number of biases
related to, for example, our ability to retrieve or imagine similar instances.123
One of the clearest demonstrations of the availability heuristic is a person’s
temporary increase in the subjective probability of an event occurring after
recently witnessing or experiencing one such incident—e.g., a person may have
an higher subjective probability of a car accident after driving by the aftermath of
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a collision.124 In these cases, people often arrive at an exaggerated perception of
the likelihood of a car accident occurring.
These biases should also be of real concern to parties in adjudication, especially
in the context of specialized adjudication commonly occurring in public law.
Where adjudicators are likely to experience similar facts in a reoccurring manner,
they may be susceptible to misjudging the credibility of parties or positions, based
on the availability of past experience. In the adjudicative setting, particularly in
administrative law, decision makers may specialize in one niche area of the law or
its governing statutes. For example, in the immigration setting, an investigating
officer may focus on one or two countries or regions. There are obvious benefits to
developing knowledge about the specific region and its peoples. However, these
specializations increase adjudicators’ susceptibility to heuristic-based reasoning
and the availability heuristic in particular.
5.

CONFIRMATION BIAS

Confirmation bias is the tendency for a person to discriminate in the collection
and weighing of information and evidence to confirm an initial hypothesis
or preference.125 It is similar to anchoring in the sense that “decision makers
examine evidence expected to confirm the hypothesis rather than evidence that
could disconfirm the hypothesis.”126 Confirmation bias is relevant in adjudication
because it affects the process embarked on by a decision maker. It operates by
increasing the confidence of the adjudicator in their decision, thereby creating
a general overconfidence that an answer is correct: “The stronger and more
numerous the reasons that are recruited, the greater is the confidence expressed
in the selected answer.”127 In the adjudicative setting, the pronounced effects of
confirmation bias may manifest in decisions to arbitrarily ignore or discredit
otherwise credible evidence. In subtle instances, where information does not
naturally lend itself to one conclusion or another, the symptoms of confirmation
bias will be veiled.
124. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability” (1973) 5 Cognitive Psychology 207 at 230.
125. See Gretchen B Chapman & Eric J Johnson, “Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in
Judgements of Belief and Value” in Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, supra note 4, 120 at 133;
Raymond S Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises”
(1998) 2 Rev General Psychology 175 at 175. See also Kahneman, supra note 3 at 81.
126. Chapman & Johnson, supra note 125 at 133.
127. Derek J Koehler, Lyle Brenner & Dale Griffin, “The Calibration of Expert Judgement:
Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory” in Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, supra
note 4, 686 at 692.
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Confirmation bias has the potential to prejudice the evidence-gathering
process for decision making. An objective actor seeks to discover a solution by
openly considering evidence in favour of, and against, a hypothesis similar to
a rational decision-making model.128 Under the influence of confirmation bias,
however, the actor may disregard contrary evidence and over rely on evidence
that supports their hypothesis.129 Alternatively, the actor may disproportionately
seek confirming or validating evidence, which creates a circular process that
undermines an objective approach.130 Finally, the techniques used by an inquisitor,
either a judge or an administrative decision maker, in an investigative setting may
elicit confirmatory responses from an inquisitee, or the techniques may influence
the inquisitee’s responses in another manner.131
Despite its potential to prejudice the results against a party, confirmation bias
is difficult to identify. The conclusion of a person affected by confirmation bias is
typically supported by evidence and may appear well researched and convincing.132
In the context of determining the admissibility of evidence, confirmation bias
may result in overemphasizing the probative value or prejudicial effects of
proffered evidence. This is precisely the area that Piperides et al. warn may result
in the admittance of “irrelevant evidence while excluding relevant evidence.”133
This stage of decision making is discretionary and, in the absence of clear errors,
would be difficult to overturn on appeal. To raise a suspicion of confirmation
bias, a reviewer must re-evaluate the merit of the initial conclusion in order to
find that evidence contrary to the hypothesis was ignored or underweighted.
These nuanced implications of cognitive bias are precisely where a test, such as
the RAB test, would be helpful, especially if appellate review on the merits may
not provide a sufficient remedy.
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III. THE DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING THE RAB ANALYSIS IN
CASES OF COGNITIVE BIAS
The nature of cognitive biases makes the application of the RAB analysis to
certain facts difficult, if not impossible. Heuristics belong to the part of the
mind responsible for intuition. However, decisions are not made in silos; rather,
they involve collaboration between System 1 and System 2.134 Consequently,
most decisions have an element of intuitive reasoning. That System 1 is always
active means that decisions are void of intuition only when System 2 completely
overrides the former. Moreover, even tasks that attract System 2 override are prone
to System 1 reasoning through persistent repetition and increased proficiency.
Decisions that were previously purely deliberative may become intuitive and
heuristic-reliant in the future.
The cognitive biases identified in the previous section are extremely difficult
to prove. In order to establish a RAB claim, we would likely require patterns of
behaviour or a set of sufficiently similar past cases. Nevertheless, merely relying on
an analysis of an adjudicator’s past decision making would likely be insufficient to
rebut the presumption of impartiality in the RAB analysis.135 Each case must be
reviewed based on the facts and circumstances that give rise to the bias claim;136
correlation cannot be taken as evidence of causation.
It may be possible, however, to identify the representativeness heuristic and
confirmation bias on a case-by-case basis as both can manifest in reasoning. The
representativeness heuristic is present where the probability that a subject belongs
to a particular group or category is determined by the degree to which its traits are
representative of, or similar to, our stereotypical understanding of the group.137
The representativeness heuristic can be identified where reasoning is dependent
only on the similarities of a subject to a group, as opposed to direct evidence.
Confirmation bias is the tendency for a person to discriminate in the collection
and weighing of information and evidence to confirm an initial hypothesis or
preference.138 In the context of oral hearings, confirmation bias can be identified
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by analyzing the adjudicator’s treatment of parties; the relative volume, tone, and
framing of questions can foreshadow the fate of the applicant.139
The following subsections use a hypothetical scenario to assess whether the
indicators of representativeness or confirmation bias can be caught by the RAB
analysis. The first two subsections test subtle manifestations of cognitive biases.
The next two subsections test more identifiable manifestations of bias. Overall,
the analyses of the hypothetical scenario show that the RAB analysis is responsive
to cognitive biases only when their manifestation is observable and identifiable.
Take a moment to review the following hypothetical scenario:
Imagine a civil trial where a physiotherapist allegedly sexually assaulted a patient.
The case turns on credibility. Early on in the proceeding, the judge allowed an
adjournment so that the plaintiff could fix certain defects with their claim.
Throughout the hearing, the judge was dismissive. However, the judge was more
critical of the defence counsel’s answers to questions than the plaintiff counsel’s
responses, at one point even waving to the physiotherapist’s lawyer to stop and
saying “blah, blah, blah” in an attempt to speed up the response. During the
proceeding, when the defence counsel was arguing for the reform of a certain law,
the judge noted a preference for the law as it currently is and warned that the lawyer
was facing an uphill battle.
The transcript of the proceeding showed that the judge asked the physiotherapist’s
lawyer over twice as many questions. It further showed that the judge used more
hostile language when speaking with defence counsel.
The judge ultimately ruled in the complainant’s favour. In the reasons for the
decision, the judge also took note of the complainant’s religious conviction and
conservative attire in the courtroom.

A. THE VOLUME OF QUESTIONS

The relative number of questions that a party faces can foreshadow, with accuracy,
the result of the adjudication. Christine M. Venter posits that an adjudicator who
is asking a high volume of questions may be “seeking out information to support
their innate hypothesis of the case.”140 In the context of appellate courts and
appellate tribunals, adjudicators may ask more questions in order to analogize
a case to a previously established precedent.141 Where information is not

139. See Venter, supra note 132 at 49.
140. Ibid at 61.
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confirmatory, they may overlook the challenging or contradictory information
and continue pressing on different issues.142
Research on the United States Supreme Court has also shown that the party
facing the most questions in oral argument typically loses.143 In a further study of
the United States Seventh Circuit, 90 per cent of the cases followed this rule.144
In the latter study, not only was the losing side asked more questions, but the
judges asked almost twice as many questions of the party that ultimately lost,
representing a noticeable difference in treatment.145 Based on these statistics, the
fact that the judge asked the defendant nearly twice as many questions seems to
make the result of our hypothetical trial inevitable.
The volume of questions on its own, however, is not necessarily an indicator
of confirmation bias. It is not uncommon for one side to present a stronger case.
Decision makers who are either not persuaded by the arguments of one party or
who find the arguments to be inconsistent or contradictory will need to ask more
questions to clarify their understanding. This is precisely what we would expect
of a methodical and objective adjudicator. As discussed in Part I, above, Justices
L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin in S (RD) noted that “a conscious, contextual
inquiry has become an accepted step towards judicial impartiality.”146 It is unlikely
that the informed reasonable person, as described by Justice de Grandpré, would
consider a disproportionality of questions as indicative of bias without further
context. Therefore, while frequency of questions may indicate cognitive bias,
it is unlikely to prove bias in the eyes of the informed reasonable person.
B. THE MODE OF ADJUDICATOR INTERVENTIONS

Beyond the volume of questions faced, the timing and frequency of an adjudicator’s
interventions can signal a RAB.147 The focus here is on the treatment of the
parties—e.g., being cut off repeatedly and treated dismissively—rather than the
number of questions asked. In our hypothetical scenario, the trial judge was
dismissive of the defence. At one point, counsel was even interrupted and waved
to speed up the response.
At first glance, these facts may demonstrate elements of confirmation bias,
that the judge had already made up their mind. However, these instances again
142.
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must be considered in light of the overall case. The Court of Appeal for Ontario
found that there was no RAB in a case where a judge, in reference to a party’s
evidence, said “blah, blah, blah.”148 Rather than signalling a disregard for the
evidence being presented, a thorough analysis of the transcript revealed that the
phrase was being used as a substitute for “et cetera” in multiple instances.149
Based on our understanding of the RAB analysis in Part I, above, it can be
argued that the informed reasonable person would have sufficient knowledge
of the decision-making process and past cases to appreciate that adjudicators
should not be held to the standard of perfection with respect to body language,
tone, or diction.150 The understanding and flexibility of the informed reasonable
person affords a high level of deference to adjudicators. It also means that veiled
cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias, whose presence may be seen in the
use of impolite or dismissive behaviour would not reach the threshold required
by the RAB analysis.
C. THE TONE AND LANGUAGE CHOICE OF THE ADJUDICATOR

The tone of the adjudicator has the potential to attract behavioural confirmation,
and it may identify the presence of confirmation bias.151 In the judicial context,
studies have shown that judges use a more hostile tone in exchanges with
losing counsel.152 Venter identifies hostility by analyzing the choice of words,
the “willingness to interrupt and disagree,” and the level of unfriendliness.153
Moreover, she notes that the presence of scepticism in the tone can also signal
the presence of confirmation bias.154 In Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd. v. IFS Vehicle
Distributors ULC (“Stuart Budd”), the fact that the “judge repeatedly criticized
appellants’ counsel on matters including their advocacy skills, knowledge of the
law, and handling of the matter” was a factor in the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s
decision to set aside the previous order.155
Alertness to an adjudicator’s tone and hostility can be used by a lawyer to
identify potential confirmation bias. A party can identify signs of confirmation
bias by measuring the relative use of unpleasant words against an established
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norm.156 A lawyer can assess the relative frequency of these exchanges by
codifying unpleasant words, i.e., those “reflecting strong emotional content,”
such as “idiotic.”157 A comparison of the treatment of the two parties, along
with analyses of previous hearings presided over by the adjudicator, may give rise
to a RAB claim.
In our hypothetical example, the judge was more hostile towards the defence.
It may be possible to use the prevalence of unpleasant or offensive language on
the part of the adjudicator to argue an appearance of bias that can be caught by
the RAB test, even when no confirmation bias or actual bias exists. This is an
example of where behaviour that can indicate the presence of cognitive biases can
also be caught by the RAB analysis. Unfortunately, this is possible only because
the bias manifests in such a way that it is clear and observable.
D. CHOICE OF PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE ADJUDICATOR

Knowledge of the law and legal process can be helpful in demonstrating the
existence of a RAB where an adjudicator, influenced by confirmation bias,
follows only certain procedures or conventions (or parts of certain procedures
or conventions) that confirm their hypothesis. This is because the informed
reasonable person would have the requisite and complete knowledge of the rules
and past decisions of the court or administrative body and would be able to
identify when the applicable process is not followed.
In the hypothetical scenario, the trial judge ordered an adjournment so
that the plaintiffs could correct their claim. This is similar to the facts of Stuart
Budd, where the judge adjourned the case, at their own initiative, to allow the
respondents to correct a flaw fatal to their case.158 The Court of Appeal for
Ontario determined that the procedural deviations contributed to a RAB.159 This
is another example of a potential manifestation of cognitive bias that could be
caught by the RAB analysis; the bias is overt and identifiable.
Adjudicators in the administrative setting who fail to follow prescribed
procedures are more commonly in violation of the legitimate expectations
doctrine, potentially undermining the principles of procedural and natural
justice, which obviates the need to engage the RAB analysis and link the conduct
to cognitive biases. Legitimate expectations are formed based on official practices
and communications, assurances that certain procedures are to be followed or
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that a particular result will be reached, and past practices followed voluntarily by
the tribunal.160 They may also arise from the conduct of the decision maker.161
Legitimate expectations must be “clear, unambiguous and unqualified” and do
not require reliance on the part of the claiming party.162 Justice Binnie likened
the necessary precision of legitimate expectations to private law, where a contract
must be “sufficiently certain to be capable of enforcement.”163
Remedies for breach of procedural fairness based on the legitimate
expectations of parties capture obvious cases of confirmation bias affecting a
tribunal’s process. The argument that confirmation bias has risen to the level
of a RAB will likely be used only in addition to—and will be secondary to—a
challenge based on the violation of procedural justice and the parties’ legitimate
expectations. In such circumstances, the ability to tailor remedies to the specific
injustice suffered makes it unlikely that courts will entertain a RAB challenge
grounded in confirmation bias. The RAB test has a greater likelihood of success
where the bias is alleged to have occurred in a courtroom setting, similar to the
facts in Stuart Budd.

IV. THE SCOPE OF THE RAB ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVE
REMEDIES
The intuitive override model of judicial decision making recognizes the
susceptibility of adjudicators to heuristic reasoning and, in certain cases, their
ability to override intuition. When intuition is not resisted, the RAB analysis is
an inadequate and inappropriate tool to protect parties against veiled cognitive
biases affecting an adjudicator’s decision making. Part II of this article identified
instances where adjudicators are, or could be, susceptible to heuristics and
cognitive biases that may result in systemic bias in judgement and decision
making. Part III presented the difficulty of identifying cognitive biases in a
particular case or decision. These findings indicate that cognitive biases, to the
extent that they have not risen to obvious cases of bias, are beyond the scope of
the RAB analysis and that the test is effectively underinclusive.
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A. THE SCOPE OF THE RAB ANALYSIS

The RAB test is an appeal to the guiding principle that “justice should not only
be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”164 The
SCC has underscored that this “maxim applies whenever the circumstances create
the danger of an injustice.”165 The RAB analysis seeks to address circumstances
where bias on the part of the adjudicator may have affected the decision. It casts
a wide net by recognizing that the appearance of bias, regardless of the existence
of actual bias, is sufficient to show a RAB.166 Proving actual bias is, for the most
part, a fruitless pursuit.167 It is for this reason that parties often concede at the
outset that there has been no actual bias.168 At first blush, the RAB test appears
to be intentionally overinclusive. We want observers and participants in the legal
system to see that justice is done; it promotes confidence in the legal system.
However, the RAB analysis relies on a simple, yet outdated, assumption that
bias can be seen.
As discussed in Part II, cognitive biases are part of our automatic function
and are often extremely difficult to isolate and identify in the decision-making
process. A complainant who submits that cognitive bias rises to the level of
a RAB has the daunting task of persuading a reasonably informed bystander
to reasonably perceive cognitive bias on the part of the adjudicator. In effect,
the difficulty in identifying cognitive biases, along with the presumption of
impartiality and the high threshold for proving bias, appears to limit the scope of
the RAB analysis to instances of overt cognitive biases.
The desire to promote the perception of justice, the second part of the R. v.
Sussex Justices (“Sussex Justices”) maxim,169 is the very element that increases the
likelihood of false negative errors: instances where bias has affected the decision,
but its hand is invisible, and the RAB test is not met. In the criminal justice context,
jurors are more concerned with the risk of false positive errors. In Blackstone’s
ratio, a false negative, the acquittal of ten guilty persons, is preferred to a false
positive, the conviction of a single innocent person. A similar preference to deter
false positive errors in the context of bias is inappropriate. The preoccupation
with avoiding false positives in the RAB analysis makes the system vulnerable
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to real bias and results in the inevitable violation of the Sussex Justices maxim by
delivering the perception of justice but failing to deliver justice itself.
The RAB test appears more attuned to our conventional sense of bias
than to the development of heuristics science. The starting presumption of
impartiality is not easily reconcilable with the override model of judicial
decision making and the finding that judges are susceptible to cognitive biases.
Moreover, the requirement of an apprehension of bias precludes that which we
cannot apprehend—for instance, the exact workings and thought process of an
adjudicator’s mind. Cognitive biases that influence decisions to the extent that
they rise to our ordinary understanding of bias, “a predisposition or prejudice,”170
can be reconciled with the RAB analysis. There is a blind spot, however, where
the effects of cognitive bias are veiled or subtle.
The effects of the blind spot in the RAB analysis may be remedied on appeal.
Where heuristic reasoning results in an error of law by way of misapplication
or overextension of the law, it is subject to a correctness standard and can be
remedied by the error-checking function of appellate courts.171 Unfortunately,
where heuristic reasoning results in errors categorized as questions of fact or
questions of mixed fact and law, complainants and appellate judges face a more
difficult task. First, on appeal, complainants bear the burden of overcoming the
more demanding “palpable and overriding error” standard.172 In these situations,
the trial judge or administrative adjudicator is afforded significant deference
in their findings, and relief absent clear prejudice is unlikely. Second, and as a
consequence of the deference afforded to first-level decision makers, appellate
judges who are not satisfied that a palpable and overriding error has been made face
a potential dilemma: to deny relief or to “stretch the law to find a legal error.”173
Finally, it is possible for the judiciary and the legislature to build mechanisms
to prevent certain types of reasoning that are likely informed by cognitive biases.
Consider, for example, the judge’s comments on attire and religious conviction
in the hypothetical scenario in Part III, above. These comments may suggest
a series of underlying biases such as the representativeness or the availability
heuristics. However, this form of reasoning, in this particular context, does not
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require a RAB claim to provide a remedy. Reliance on a person’s attire or religious
conviction to determine their credibility in a sexual assault case is prohibited.174
This part of the hypothetical scenario was loosely based on R. v. Santhosh
(“Santhosh”), which, like the hypothetical scenario, dealt with a physiotherapist
who was alleged to have sexually assaulted his patient.175 In Santhosh, the trial
judge took note of the complainant’s conservative attire in the courtroom and
her religious conviction.176 The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the
appeal, finding that the trial judge had not placed material weight on attire or
religious conviction.177 However, it warned that placing weight on such factors
is impermissible and runs close to the prohibited stereotypes.178 Rules against
the prohibited stereotypes have been developed to prevent prohibited reasoning
and dispel certain prejudicial myths that can impact the admissibility and
evaluation of evidence.
B. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO ADDRESS THE BLIND SPOT IN THE RAB
ANALYSIS

The concerns advocated by the H&B school suggest that safeguards should be in
place to prevent systematic errors caused by cognitive biases. Where these biases
manifest in clear and conventional forms, the RAB analysis has the potential to
do just that. However, alternative measures may be necessary in cases that fall
within the blind spot. In these circumstances, we must identify ways to manage
the reliance on intuition.
Potential recommendations must go beyond fine-tuning intuition. While
intuitive decision making has the potential to provide accurate and timely
predictions, it is also the pathway for undesirable influences.179 Guthrie, Rachlinski,
and Wistrich warn that “the capacity to use intuitive thinking successfully may
require years of ‘effortful study’ as well as accurate and reliable feedback on earlier
judgments”; such a process is not readily available to adjudicators.180 They suggest
that judges do not exist in an environment that allows them to perfect their
intuitive decision-making processes.181 For example, while appeals may be an
avenue for another court to remedy bias in the initial trial, it is too removed
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from the adjudicator of first instance to provide timely and effective feedback.182
Moreover, it is unlikely and uncomfortable for parties in litigation to provide
such feedback; in certain cases, they may face sanctions where their feedback is
not carefully worded.183
Fortunately, if we accept the intuitive override model of decision making,
adjudicators are capable, in certain settings, of overriding intuitive decision
making. Therefore, it is possible to address, to a certain extent, the blind spot
associated with the RAB analysis through preventative measures premised on
increasing adjudicators’ knowledge of heuristics and their operation. Some
scholars have also advised on potential intervention-based techniques that
affect the adjudicative process. While these solutions have merit, there remain
concerns about their effectiveness and whether the benefit outweighs the cost of
implementation.
1.

INTERVENTION-BASED MEASURES TO REDUCE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO
COGNITIVE BIASES

Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich offer the possibility of judicial deliberation
as a way to reduce cognitive bias in adjudication.184 Deliberation would allow
adjudicators to discuss crucial issues or findings with a panel of their peers.
This method of adjudication is currently available in administrative law, where,
in certain tribunals, decision makers may deliberate with members who are not
adjudicating. These deliberations, however, do not fully prevent cognitive biases
and instead, may invite groupthink mentality and systemic bias. The same RAB
analysis is applied in cases where deliberation is available.185 Moreover, such an
implementation would place a heavy demand on the justice system and would be
contrary to how the court currently operates.
There is an additional risk that deliberated decisions could implicitly
be given additional weight. An appellate judge reviewing a deliberated trial
decision may feel added pressure to arrive at a concurring decision. Similarly,
a lawyer may incorrectly influence an adjudicator to place additional weight
on deliberated decisions over non-deliberated decisions from the same level of
tribunal. Furthermore, there is a risk of regional power imbalance within the
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same jurisdiction if, between regions, there is inequality of adjudicative resources
that limit certain regions’ abilities to deliberate decisions.
A second recommendation proffered by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich is
to increase the amount of time available to judges when they are facing “cognitive
overload” and to increase the number of written opinions, as opposed to oral
judgments.186 Increasing the time available to decision makers has the added
benefit of improving the conditions of decision making—alertness to emotional
or mental states that increase the likelihood of snap, heuristic-driven decisions.187
However, this recommendation also raises concerns about the allocation
of scarce judicial resources. The justice system needs to balance the resource
limitations of the courts and tribunals with the severity of issues. Increasing
the number of written judgments will likely reduce the number of cases heard.
Moreover, it may mean that justice is delayed for the cases that are heard. Perhaps
most significantly, delays in the criminal context may mean that perpetrators are
able to walk free if the delay violates the framework in R. v. Jordan:
At the heart of the new framework is a ceiling beyond which delay is presumptively
unreasonable. The presumptive ceiling is set at 18 months for cases going to trial in
the provincial court, and at 30 months for cases going to trial in the superior court
(or cases going to trial in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry).188

In the alternative, the buildup of decisions that need to be written may on their
own overwhelm judges and adjudicators, which poses its own concerns.
2.

PREVENTATIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO COGNITIVE
BIASES

The first step in reducing adjudicators’ vulnerability to improper, intuitive
decision making is to break the link between bias and behaviour.189 While
most of the judges studied by Faigman et al. believe themselves to be within
the highest quartile of objectivity, these blanket and strong beliefs create a real
risk for “behaving in ways that belie our self-conception.”190 Holding onto an
initial belief or presumption that one is objective increases susceptibility to
biases.191 These findings are consistent with the notion that System 2 fulfills a
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gatekeeping or supervisory role over the proposals of System 1.192 If adjudicators
believe that they are objective, it can affect the degree to which they scrutinize
their intuitive judgements. Faigman et al. argue that adjudicators should actively
remind themselves¾despite their position, role, and status¾that they are “human
and fallible.”193
After challenging the presumption of superior objectivity, the next step must
be to increase our understanding of how heuristics “can…help the law make
better choices.”194 The following suggestions to reduce adjudicators’ susceptibility
to bias are premised on advancing this objective. Both schools of heuristics
research, F&F and H&B, agree that “if we are worried about ‘bad decisions,’
it is usually preferable to change the cues the decision maker confronts or to
delegate decisions.”195 While delegation is not a viable option in adjudication,
it is possible to change the way adjudicators view heuristics and rely on cues.
Moreover, Faigman et al. argue that the justice system should find ways to
motivate adjudicators to better understand unconscious biases, heuristics, and
implicit reasoning in order to modify their behaviour accordingly.196 They find
that when parties are motivated to understand cognitive biases, they are also likely
to engage in self-learning and to approach decision making with an increased
alertness to intuitive reasoning.197
Beyond improving adjudicators’ basic understanding of heuristics, cognitive
biases can be combatted with “countertypical associations.”198 This operates
in cases where we hold a negative attitude towards a group.199 Countertypical
association occurs where increased exposure to members of a group that we would
hold a positive attitude towards reduces our implicit negative association.200 In the
ideal case, exposure would be achieved through direct contact with members
of the group; however, serious diversification of the bench and bar would take
enormous resources—both economically and politically—to achieve, and even
diversification alone may have only a slight effect.201 In the absence of direct
192. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 4 at 51.
193. Supra note 187 at 1173.
194. Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer, “Law and Heuristics: An Interdisciplinary Venture” in
Gigerenzer & Engel, supra note 56, 1 at 14.
195. Kelman, supra note 68 at 230.
196. Supra note 187 at 1176.
197. Ibid.
198. Ibid at 1169.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid.
201. Ibid at 1170.

372

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

exposure, vicarious exposure to the group and indirect inferences stand as an
alternative.202 To satisfy indirect exposure, Faigman et al. suggest, for example,
providing adjudicators with a questionnaire that involves positive members of
the target group and negative members of the majority group to even out the
perceived associations.203 Ultimately, this form of recommendation is limited in
effect and exposure. It is also difficult to determine the possible success rates.
In the context of attribute substitution, Kahneman and Frederick note that it is
also possible to reduce the susceptibility to attribute substitution by “alerting the
respondents to the possibility that their judgement could be contaminated by an
irrelevant variable.”204
Finally, adjudicators can create systems of accountability and tracking.
Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich recommend that adjudicators implement a
checklist-style error test in order to add an element of rule-based thinking to
decisions that are more intuitive.205 They propose an analytical approach similar
to the way doctors query an initial diagnostic hunch, rather than a complete
dismissal of intuition.206 In a similar vein, Faigman et al. recommend the use of the
“count” concept, which effectively involves asking adjudicators to quantitatively
reflect on their patterns of decision making.207 This sort of accountability system
would allow adjudicators to recognize patterns in their decision making that are
otherwise undetectable by viewing a single case.208

V. CONCLUSION
The driving force behind the RAB analysis appears to be that justice must be
seen to be done. The test relies on a detectable apprehension of bias because
we are unable to examine the adjudicator’s precise state of mind. The ultimate
question that we must ask is whether the informed reasonable person is capable of
detecting bias that cannot reasonably be seen. The answer is likely “no.” Neither
the reasonable person’s knowledge of the law nor of their community can help
discover veiled or subtle cognitive biases. We are left with the conundrum that the
original premise—that justice must be done—may be violated covertly without
triggering the current test for bias, leaving a blind spot in the RAB analysis
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unaddressed. As it stands, the structure of the RAB analysis is too vested in the
conventional understanding of bias to be extended to encompass cognitive biases.
While some cases can be properly appealed as errors of law, the appeal process
may be unresponsive in cases where cognitive bias results in factual errors. At this
time, the best remedies available are preventative. We should prioritize decreasing
adjudicators’ vulnerability to cognitive biases by increasing their understanding
of heuristics and counteracting against potential intuitive predispositions.

